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HIS article is intended to provide an updated summary of the rele-T vant Texas law regarding the recovery of legal fees and expenses in
business litigation and to highlight the most significant develop-
ments in this area of law during the Survey period.' Since our last Sur-
vey, the Texas Supreme Court discussed the discretion afforded to the
trial judge when determining whether fees awarded pursuant to the De-
claratory Judgment Act are equitable and just, however, no notable pro-
nouncements involving the recovery of attorneys' fees in Texas have been
handed down from our highest state court. 2 In addition, the Texas Su-
preme Court adopted new rules concerning the award of attorneys' fees
in class action lawsuits which were mandated, in part, by the enactment of
Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code Section 26.003 during the last
Survey period.
1. The Survey period runs from October 1, 2003 to September 1, 2004. This article is
not intended to analyze all Texas statutes that provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees.
2. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162-63 (Tex. 2004).
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Section one discusses the most common ways to recover legal fees in
business litigation cases. Section two analyzes Texas Disciplinary Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.04 and case law interpreting the same. Section
three addresses issues related to the segregation of fees. Finally, section
four discusses the recovery of litigation costs and expenses.
I. BUSINESS LITIGATION STATUTES PROVIDING FOR THE
RECOVERY OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
The general rule in Texas is that litigants are not entitled to recover
attorneys' fees and expenses from their opponent unless a contractual
3 or
statutory provision provides otherwise.4However, there are more excep-
tions to this rule. This first section introduces the statutes most com-
monly used by litigants to recover legal fees and costs and discusses
recent developments (during the Survey period) affecting these statutes.
In Texas, litigants involved in business litigation most commonly use
three statutory vehicles to recover attorneys' fees: (1) Chapter 38 of the
Civil Practice and Remedies Code (the "Code") (authorizing fees in
breach of contract actions), (2) Chapter 37 of the Code (authorizing fees
in declaratory judgment actions), and (3) Chapter 17 of the Business and
Commerce Code (authorizing fees in actions brought under the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act). 5 Statutes sanctioning the recovery of at-
torneys' fees in securities, insurance, intellectual property, antitrust law,
and covenant not to compete cases also exist under Texas law.6 Finally,
although the law in this area is unsettled, attorneys' fees can sometimes
be recovered on equitable grounds.
3. A contractual provision providing for attorneys' fees "will establish a prima facie
case that the stipulated amount is reasonable and recoverable .... The burden then shifts
to the opposing party to plead, prove, and request an issue on an affirmative defense that
(1) the contractual amount is unreasonable, and (2) a particular known amount would be
reasonable." O'Kehie v. Harris Leasing Co., 80 S.W.3d 316, 319 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
2002, no pet.) (citing F.R. Hernandez Constr. & Supply Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
578 S.W.2d 675, 677 (Tex. 1979). The parties can adopt a liberal or more rigorous standard
for recovering attorneys' fees within their contract. Wayne v. A.V.A. Vending, Inc., 52
S.W.3d 412, 417-18 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied).
4. See Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. 1999); Travelers Indem.
Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996); Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist. v.
Seven Inv. Co., 835 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. 1992); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Tex. Indus.,
Inc., 414 S.W.2d 914, 915 (Tex. 1967); Turner v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 230, 233 (Tex. 1964);
Mundy v. Knutson Constr. Co., 294 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Tex. 1956); Massey v. Columbus State
Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Simmons v.
Harris County, 917 S.W.2d 376, 377 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied);
State v. Estate of Brown, 802 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
5. Other claims that a business litigator should consider seeking are legal fees in con-
nection with include federal and certain state antitrust, trade regulation, racketeering, in-
tellectual property, and covenant not to compete claims. See infra notes 72-156. Similarly,
although not specifically addressed in this article, attorneys' fees may be awarded as
"costs" pursuant to the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN.
§ 21.259(a) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
6. See infra notes 72-156.
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A. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN BREACH OF
CONTRACT ACTIONS.
Chapter 38 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a prevail-
ing party to recover attorneys' fees and costs in a breach of contract case.7
To obtain attorneys' fees under Chapter 38, a party must satisfy three
requirements: (1) prevail8 and recover damages9 in its breach of contract
action,10 (2) present evidence of a reasonable11 fee for the services ren-
dered in connection with the prevailing claim, and (3) satisfy the procedu-
ral requirements of Section 38.002 regarding presentment. 12 Provided
7. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001-.006 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
Section 38.001 provides: "A person may recover reasonable attorney's fees from an indi-
vidual or corporation, in addition to the amount of a valid claim and costs, if the claim is
for: 1) rendered services; 2) performed labor; 3) furnished material; 4) freight or express
overcharges; 5) lost or damaged freight or express; 6) killed or injured stock; 7) a sworn
account; or 8) an oral or written contract." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001(Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005). Chapter 38 does not apply to some contracts issued by insur-
ers. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.006 (Vernon 2004). Also note that a
defendant is not entitled to attorneys' fees for successfully defending against a contract
claim. Wilson & Wilson Tax Servs., Inc. v. Mohammed, 131 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet. h.).
8. A prevailing party is one who is "vindicated by the trial court's judgment." Polk v.
St. Angelo, No. 03-01-00356-CV, 2002 WL 1070550, at *3 (Tex. App.-Austin May 31,
2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication); see also Flagship Hotel, Ltd. v. City of
Galveston, 117 S.W.3d 552, 564 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) (A "prevailing
party" means the "party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount
of damages awarded.") (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7th ed. 1999)); Brown v.
Fullenweider, 135 S.W.3d 340, 347 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) ("Simply
stated, the prevailing party is the party vindicated by the judgment rendered.").
9. See Alma Group, L.L.C. v. Palmer, 143 S.W.3d 840, 845 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 2004, pet. denied) (distinguishing attorneys' fees from damages and stating thatplaintiff must first recover damages to be awarded fees); see also Mustang Pipeline Co. v.
Driver Pipeline Co., 134 S.W.3d 195, 201 (Tex. 2004) (holding that due to plaintiff's prior
material breach of contract resulting in no damages awarded, plaintiff could not recover
attorneys' fees); Valley Ranch L.P. v. City of Irving, No. 05-03-01416-CV, 2004 WL
1418470, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 25, 2004, pet. denied) (court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding attorneys' fees where the remedy received was specific performance
and not monetary damages); Ameritech Servs., Inc. v. SCA Promotions, Inc., No. 05-03-
00247-CV, 2004 WL 237760, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 10, 2004, no pet.) (including
nominal damages award is insufficient to support award of attorneys' fees); Rasmusson v.
LBC PetroUnited, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 283, 287 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied) (specific performance constitutes a valid claim for recovery of attorneys' fees).
10. Potter v. GMP, L.L.C., 141 S.W.3d 698, 705 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, pet.
dism'd) (holding that limited liability company's regulations can be properly characterized
as contract, thereby permitting recovery of fees under section 38.001 for breach of those
regulations). A defendant cannot recover fees under Section 38.001 for defeating a breach
of contract claim. See Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Johnson, No. 03-00-00559-CV, 2002 WL
1991141, at *12 (Tex. App.-Austin Aug. 30, 2002, pet. denied). "However, the party re-questing fees need not obtain a net recovery." Gereb v. Smith-Jaye, 70 S.W.3d 272, 273(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (emphasis added).
11. Cordova v. S.W. Bell Yellow Pages, Inc., 148 S.W.3d 441,446 (Tex. App.-El Paso2004, no pet. h.) (holding that reasonableness of fees does not include a determination of
whether or not the fees were necessary for plaintiff to prevail on the cause of action).
12. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 38.001-.002 (Vernon 1997 & Supp.
2005); Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624-25 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied). Section 38.002 provides: "(1) the claimant must be repre-
sented by an attorney; (2) the claimant must present the claim to the opposing party or to a
duly authorized agent of the opposing party; and (3) payment for the just amount owed
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that a litigant satisfies these requirements, recovery of attorneys' fees
under this provision is mandatory. 13 A trial court has discretion to fix the
amount of attorneys' fees, but it does not have the discretion to com-
pletely deny attorneys' fees if the requirements of Section 38.001 have
been satisfied. 14
Importantly, the Texas Supreme Court extended Section 38.001 to pro-
vide for the recovery of attorneys' fees for fraud claims when the fraud
arises out of a breach of contract action.15 Other appellate courts have
extended this exception to any "tort" that arises out of a breach of
contract. 16
1. Presenting Evidence of a Reasonable Fee
Chapter 38 requires litigants to present evidence regarding the reason-
able nature of the fee award.17 Under section 38.003 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code, "[i]t is presumed that the usual and customary attor-
ney's fees for a claim of the type described in Section 38.001 are reasona-
ble."18 However, the fact that "usual and customary" fees are deemed
per se reasonable does not mean that the court must award the full
amount of fees.19 At least one court held that the "usual and customary"
must not have been tendered before the expiration of the 30th day after the claim is
presented." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002 (Vernon 1997).
13. See Cotter v. Todd, No. 04-01-00084-CV, 2002 WL 31253397, at *6 (Tex. App.-
San Antonio Oct. 9, 2002, no pet.); Jackson Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 23
(Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied). But see Tex. A & M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson,
127 S.W.3d 866, 874 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed) (holding that Section 38.001 does
not support awarding attorneys' fees against a public university). However, at least one
court has held that a plaintiff must have plead attorneys' fees at the trial level to recover
fees under Section 38.001. Hageman/Fritz, Byrne, Head & Harrison, L.L.P. v. Luth, 150
S.W.3d 617, 628 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet. h.).
14. World Help v. Leisure Lifestyles, Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 683 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth 1998, pet. denied).
15. See Gill Say. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1990).
16. Schindler v. Austwell Farmers Coop., 829 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1992), affd as modified, 841 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. 1992) (citing Gill Say. Ass'n, 797
S.W.2d at 31; Wilson v. Ferguson, 747 S.W.2d 499, 504 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1988, writ
denied)).
17. There are eight factors that Texas courts consistently refer to in evaluating the
reasonableness of attorneys' fees: "(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and diffi-
culty of the questions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood.. . that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal
services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained; (5) the time limitations imposed
by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relation-
ship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained
or uncertainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered." Arthur Ander-
sen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
18. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
19. Ameritech Servs., Inc. v. SCA Promotions, Inc., No. 05-03-00247-CV, 2004 WL
237760, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Feb. 10, 2004, no pet. h.) (finding that court did not abuse
its discretion in awarding no attorneys' fees where legal services were shown to be unnec-
essary when defendant made prior settlement offers exceeding plaintiff's recovery at trial);
see also Bethel v. Butler Drilling Co., 635 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
fees determined by the court create a ceiling above which the court can-
not award.2 0 Notwithstanding the ceiling, that court believed that the
court has discretion to award an amount below that ceiling.2 1 Moreover,
the presumption in favor of the reasonableness of "usual and customary"
fees can be rebutted by competent evidence.2 2
Texas courts can also take judicial notice of the usual and customary
attorneys' fees and the contents of the case file without receiving any
other evidence in a bench trial or in a jury case in which the amount of
attorneys' fees is submitted to the court with the consent of the parties.23
This means that in such circumstances the court can determine the rea-
sonable amount of attorneys' fees independent of the work described in
the case file and the "usual and customary" fees for a similar claim.2 4
2. Presentment
Presentment is an often overlooked element necessary to recover attor-
neys' fees in a breach of contract action. Section 38.002 requires a litigant
seeking attorneys' fees to "present the claim to the opposing party or to a
duly authorized agent of the opposing party. '2 5 This means that a plain-
tiff seeking fees under this chapter must both plead2 6 and prove present-
ment to recover attorneys' fees claimed.2 7 Presentment can be made
either before or after suit is filed, but presentment must be at least thirty
days before judgment.2 8 The reasoning behind the presentment require-
ment is to permit a defendant to pay a claim before incurring attorneys'
fees.2 9 However, Texas courts accept a wide range of formal and informal
methods as sufficient presentment. 30 The essential element is that there
20. Bethel, 635 S.W.2d at 841.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.004 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
24. Id.
25. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.002(2) (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
26. See Llanes v. Davila, 133 S.W.3d 635, 641 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
denied) (holding that "neither the filing of a suit, nor the allegation of a demand in the
pleadings can alone constitute presentment of a claim or a demand that the claim be paid"
and refusing to consider demand at mediation because lack of record of such alleged
presentment).
27. VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys. Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 867 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
28. Id. at 868. The pleadings themselves do not constitute demand. See Grace v.
Duke, 54 S.W.3d 338, 344 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied) ("[T]he mere filing of a
breach of contract suit does not constitute presentment.").
29. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 867-68.
30. See Long Trusts v. Griffin, 144 S.W.3d 99, 109 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet.
filed) (finding long history of correspondence and negotiations prior to suit constituted
sufficient presentment under section 38.002); Criton Corp. v. Highlands Ins. Co., 809
S.W.2d 355, 358 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (holding that oral
request to tender full performance under contract, which was refused, sufficient to estab-
lish presentment); Jones v. Kelley, 614 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex. 1981) (holding letter and tele-
phone conversation informing sellers of buyers' intentions to go through with sale of
property met requirements of presentment); Hudson v. Smith, 391 S.W.2d 441, 451 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (prior lawsuit).
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is notice given before a judgment. 31 However, an unreasonably excessive
demand is improper and will result in disallowal of fees. 32 Further, pre-
sentment can be contractually waived.
33
B. RECOVERING ATTORNEYS' FEES IN DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT ACTIONS
Section 37.009 of the Declaratory Judgments Act permits the recovery
of costs and attorneys' fees in a declaratory judgment action.34 Under
Section 37.009, the decision of whether to award attorneys' fees is at the
discretion of the trial court.35 Furthermore, even a non-prevailing party
can recover fees. 36
While the award of attorneys' fees is at the court's discretion, the code
imposes certain limits on that discretion.37 First, the fees must be "rea-
sonable and necessary."'38 Whether the fees are "reasonable and neces-
sary" are fact questions.
39
Second, the recovery of fees must also be "equitable and just."' 40 The
question of whether the award of fees is "equitable and just" is an issue to
be resolved by the trial court.41 In a recent decision, Ridge Oil Co. v.
31. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 867-68.
32. Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. BBE, L.L.C., 105 S.W.3d 66, 73 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2003,
pet. denied).
33. Escalante v. Luckie, 77 S.W.3d 410, 423 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2002, pet. denied).
34. TEX. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
35. Id.; see Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 171-72 (Tex. 2004) (upholding
trial court's decision to deny fees to both parties where each had "legitimate interests to
pursue"); Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20 (Tex. 1998) ("The statute thus affords the
trial court a measure of discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees or not.");
Oake v. Collin County, 692 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. 1985) ("[T]he grant or denial of attor-
ney's fees in a declaratory judgment action lies within the discretion of the trial court, and
its judgment will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear showing that it abused that
discretion.").
36. Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d
618, 637 (Tex. 1996) ("[T]he award of attorney's fees in declaratory judgment actions is
clearly within the trial court's discretion and is not dependent on a finding that a party
,substantially prevailed."'); see also SAVA Gumarska in Kemijska Industria D.D. v. Ad-
vanced Polymer Sci., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 304, 324 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.) (hold-
ing that an appellate court may remand an attorneys' fees award when reversing a
declaratory judgment award, but that it is not required to do so because a nonprevailing
party can be awarded fees). But see Nat'l Cafe Servs., Ltd. v. Podaras, 148 S.W.3d 194, 198
(Tex. App.-Waco 2004, pet. denied) (stating that while trial court acts within its discretion
in awarding fees, the court "bases that exercise of discretion in part on whether a party
prevails on the merits"); McMillan v. Dooley, 144 S.W.3d 159, 186 (Tex. App.-Eastland
2004, pet. filed) (remanding case where the trial record did not indicate whether award of
fees would still be equitable and just in light of reversal on the merits.).
37. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 20.
38. TEX Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
39. Marion v. Davis, 106 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied)
("[Plaintiff] did not request any findings of fact on the attorney's fees issue, and none were
filed. Without findings of fact establishing the basis for the trial court's exercise of discre-
tion, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the court abused its discretion in declining
to award attorney's fees.").
40. TEX CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
41. Ridge Oil Co. v. Guinn Invs., Inc., 148 S.W.3d 143, 162-63 (Tex. 2004) ("Whether it
is 'equitable and just' to award less than the fees found by a jury is not a fact question
2005]
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Guinn Investments, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court examined the "equita-
ble and just" prong of Section 37.009.42 In that case, Ridge Oil Company("Ridge") prevailed on its declaratory judgment action and the jury
found that Ridge incurred reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees of$200,895.82 in preparing the case for trial and would incur an additional
$45,000 in attorneys' fees on appeal. 43 The trial court reduced the award
to $175,000 for trial and $20,000 for appeal without specifying the basis
for the reduction. 44 On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Ridge con-
tended that a trial court's discretion over the award of attorneys' fees in a
declaratory judgment does not include the discretion to partially reduce ajury's finding of the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney's
fees.45 The Texas Supreme Court disagreed and held that the trial court
was within its discretion to award some but not all of the fees stating:
There are times ... when the trial court determines that equity andjustice preclude it from awarding the full amount of fees that the jury
found to be reasonable and necessary. In this case, the trial judge
necessarily concluded that it would not be equitable and just to
award Ridge the full amount of attorney's fees, but that it would also
be inequitable and unjust to award no attorney's fees even though
the court had discretion to do So. 4 6
Although the court has discretion to award fees it believes are equita-
bly justified, it cannot do so until it has been factually determined that the
fees are "reasonable and necessary. '47 The Corpus Christi Court of Ap-
peals, in VICC Homeowners' Association v. Los Campeones, Inc., stated
that it would be an abuse of discretion to award fees prior to determining
whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support a finding that the
fees are reasonable and necessary.48 Further, the court stated that an
award of attorneys' fees must abide by the declaration; thus, only after
the trial court declares the parties' rights under the UDJA should the
court address attorneys' fees.49
Finally, fees cannot be awarded when the declaratory judgment claim
or counterclaim is the "mirror image" of another asserted claim where "a
judicial declaration would add nothing to what would be implicit or ex-
because the determination is not susceptible to direct proof but is rather a matter of fair-
ness in light of all the circumstances."); Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 ("Matters of equity are
addressed to the trial court's discretion ... [s]o is the responsibility for just decisions.")
42. See Ridge Oil, 148 S.W.3d at 162-63.
43. Id. at 161.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 162.
46. Id.
47. Bocquet, 972 S.W.2d at 21 ("Unreasonable fees cannot be awarded, even if the
court believed them just, but the court may conclude that it is not equitable or just to
award even reasonable and necessary fees."); VICC Homeowners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Los
Campeones, Inc., 143 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no pet. h.) (hold-ing that where a court has not reviewed evidence on the reasonable and necessary require-
ment for the award of fees, the award of attorneys' fees may be an abuse of discretion.).




press in a final judgment for the enforceable remedy."'50 However, the
question often becomes whether the issue is already pending before the
court when the request for a declaration is sought-if it is not, fees can be
awarded so long as the declaration sought does not closely resemble the
plaintiff's claims.51 Thus, a litigant should promptly assert a request for a
declaratory judgment to preserve the right to recover attorneys' fees.5
2
C. RECOVERING ArrORNEYS' FEES IN DECEPTIVE TRADE
PRACTICES ACTIONS
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA") also permits the
recovery of attorneys' fees. In fact, any consumer who prevails on a
DTPA claim "shall" be awarded court costs and attorneys' fees. 53 Con-
versely, a defendant may recover attorneys' fees under the DTPA if the
court finds that an action was groundless in law or fact, brought in bad
faith, or initiated to harass the defendant. 54 Whether the plaintiff or de-
fendant recovers attorneys' fees, the fees must be "reasonable and
necessary. 55
The interpretation of "reasonable" by the Texas courts in context of
attorneys' fees awarded under the DTPA has produced strange results.
The Texas Supreme Court held that attorneys' fees may be reasonable as
between the client and attorney for purposes of the standard set forth in
Rule 104 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, but
unreasonable in the context of an award for attorneys' fees under the
DTPA.56 Thus, in the case of a contingent fee contract, a consumer may
need to use part of his or her DTPA recovery to compensate his or her
attorney for the agreed upon rate of attorneys' fees, leaving the consumer
without full recovery.
1. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Consumer
As mentioned above, section 17.50(d) of the DTPA provides that a pre-
vailing consumer shall be awarded court costs and reasonable and neces-
50. Gibson v. Fauber, No. 12-02-00249-CV, 2004 WL 2002560, at *13 (Tex. App.-
Tyler Sept. 8, 2004, pet. filed) (quoting Strayhorn v. Raytheon E-Sys., Inc., 101 S.W.3d 558,
572 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. denied) (holding that it is improper to rely on section
37.009 solely to recover attorney fees where declaratory judgment would be redundant to
the other relief sought)); Bloys v. Wilson, No. 03-03-00193-CV, 2004 WL 162974, at *12
(Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 29, 2004, pet. denied) (holding attorneys' fees can be awarded
where the declaratory relief sought in a counterclaim is more than a mere denial of claim-
ant's original claims); see also Whiteside v. Griffis & Griffis, P.C., 902 S.W.2d 739, 746-77
(Tex. App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).
51. See BHP Petroleum Co. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990).
52. Hopkins v. Netterville, No. 12-00-00339-CV, 2002 WL 59278, at *8 (Tex. App.-
Tyler Jan. 16, 2002, pet. denied) ("[A] declaratory judgment action may not be used solely
to obtain attorney's fees that are not otherwise authorized by statute or to settle disputes
already pending before a court."); see also Gibson, 2004 WL 2002560, at *13.
53. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
54. Id. § 17.50(c).
55. See supra notes 41-42.
56. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997).
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sary attorneys' fees. 57 Since the award is mandatory, the critical
determination is whether the consumer has "prevailed. '58 The Texas Su-
preme Court has interpreted the word "prevailed" liberally. The court
held, for example, that a consumer prevails if the consumer has been
awarded any of the remedies authorized under section 17.50(b), even if a
net recovery was awarded against the consumer. 59 However, the Dallas
Court of Appeals recently held that where the jury does not award the
plaintiff any damages from a DTPA claim, such plaintiff is not entitled to
recover attorneys' fees.60
Given that many suits involve successful and unsuccessful DTPA
claims, courts often allocate fees between the claims unless there is a sub-
stantial overlap among the claims.61 Additionally, as with all fee awards,
an award should include appropriate amounts for appeals or be reduced
if an appeal is not taken.62
2. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Defendant
Because the DTPA provides consumers with substantial powers against
defendants, the statute could potentially be used to harass or intimidate.
To prevent such abuses, the DTPA provides for an award of attorneys'
fees to a defendant when the consumer's suit was "groundless in fact or
law or brought in bad faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment. '63
As with a consumer's recovery of attorneys' fees, if the defendant meets
this requirement and satisfies the prevail requirement, the award of attor-
neys' fees is mandatory.
The existence of bad faith, groundlessness, or harassment is determined
by the court, not the jury.64 These terms are not defined in the DTPA,
but the Texas Supreme Court applied the definition of Rule 13 of the
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to define "groundless" for purposes of the
DTPA as a suit with "[n]o basis in law or fact and not warranted by good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
57. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(d) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
58. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 567 (Tex. 2002) (denying
attorneys' fees for failure to prevail on DTPA claim).
59. McKinley v. Drozd, 685 S.W.2d 7, 9 (Tex. 1985).
60. Blue Star Operating Co. v. Tetra Tech., Inc., 119 S.W.3d 916, 922 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (citing Cooper v. Lyon Fin. Servs., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 197, 209 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (stating that where jury found party "engaged in
knowing violations of DTPA" but "zero dollars would fairly and reasonably compensate"
claimant for damages caused by that conduct, trial court properly denied attorneys' fees)).
61. See Williamson v. Tucker, 615 S.W.2d 881, 892 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). The duty to segregate fees also applies between DTPA claims and other
causes of action, such as tort or breach of contract. See also Chapa v. Tony Gullo Motors I,
L.P., No. 09-03-568-CV, 2004 WL 1902533, at *9 (Tex. App.-Beaumont Aug. 26, 2004,
pet. filed) ("An exception to the duty to segregate arises when the attorney's fees are
incurred in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction, and which are so
interrelated that their prosecution entails proof of essentially the same facts.").
62. See Int'l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Spray, 468 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. 1971).
63. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
64. Id.; Donwerth v. Preston II Chrysler-Dodge, Inc., 775 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tex. 1989).
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law."'65 "Bad faith," although not defined in DTPA case law, has been
defined in many other contexts as any indicia of improper motive, such as
ill will, spite, malice, reckless disregard, or dishonesty.66 Finally, "harass-
ment," although not defined in the DTPA, generally means annoyance,
irritation, or disturbance.67
Another protection afforded to defendants under the DTPA is the no-
tice requirement of section 17.505, which requires that a consumer give a
defendant at least sixty days notice prior to filing suit.68 The notice must
give reasonable detail of the consumer's specific complaint and the
amount of all forms of damages, expenses, and any attorneys' fees rea-
sonably incurred by the consumer. 69 Failure to include attorneys' fees
should not affect the sufficiency of the notice letter but, for purposes of
attorneys' fees, allows for the presumption that none exist and settlement
may be made without payment of such fees.
70
For a defendant, a well-drafted settlement offer letter provides the best
opportunity to either recover attorneys' fees or limit its liability for the
consumer's attorneys' fees in the event the consumer is ultimately suc-
cessful. Under section 17.505, if the defendant's settlement offer was the
same, substantially the same, or more than the amount of damages found
by the trier of fact, then the consumer's attorneys' fees are limited to the
amount of reasonable and necessary attorneys' fees incurred before the
date and time of the rejected settlement offer.71 If the defendant's settle-
ment offer was for the full amount requested by the consumer in the no-
tice, but the consumer rejects the offer, the rejection is evidence that the
suit was brought for the purpose of harassment and the defendant may be
able to recover its attorneys' fees from the consumer under Section
17.50(c), even if the cause of action was not groundless.
D. OTHER STATUTES PERMITTING THE RECOVERY OF
ATTORNEYS' FEES
In addition to the more commonly used statutes providing for the re-
covery of attorneys' fees, certain other Texas statutes allow for the recov-
ery of attorneys' fees in securities, insurance, intellectual property,
antitrust, and covenant not to compete cases.
65. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(c) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
66. See McDuffie v. Blassingame, 883 S.W.2d 329, 335 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994,
writ denied). See generally Holeman v. Landmark Chevrolet Corp., 989 S.W.2d 395 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); Transport Indem. Co. v. Orgain, Bell &
Tucker, 846 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993), writ denied, 856 S.W.2d 410
(Tex. 1993) (per curiam); Zak v. Parks, 729 S.W.2d 875, 879-80 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1987, no writ).
67. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 717 (7th ed. 1990).
68. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(a) (Vernon 2004 & Supp. 2005).
69. Id.
70. See generally Minor v. Aland, 775 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ de-
nied); Silva v. Porowski, 695 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
71. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 17.505(h) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
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1. Recovering Attorneys' Fees in Shareholder Derivative Litigation
Upon the termination of a shareholder derivative lawsuit, Texas courts
are empowered to award expenses incurred by one or both of the par-
ties.72 The term "expenses" is expressly defined in the statute to include
"the reasonable expenses incurred in the defense of a derivative proceed-
ing, including without limitation: (a) attorney's fees; (b) costs in pursuing
an investigation of the matter that was the subject of the derivative pro-
ceeding; and (c) expenses for which the domestic or foreign corporation
or a corporate defendant may be required to indemnify another per-
son."'73 The language of the statute and the limited case law interpreting
it make clear that depending on the evidence either one-or all-of the
parties can collect attorneys' fees in a derivative action.
a. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Derivative Plaintiff in a
Derivative Action
Article 5.14J(1)(a) allows a trial court, in its discretion, to award a pre-
vailing plaintiff legal fees if the proceeding results in a "substantial bene-
fit" to the corporation.74 Further, a plaintiff may also recover fees from a
corporation under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific improper filings by the
corporation. 75
b. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees by a Corporation in a Derivative
Action
Article 5.14J(1)(b) allows a Texas court to, in its discretion, require the
plaintiff to pay the corporations' expenses if the court finds that the de-
rivative proceeding was "commenced or maintained without reasonable
72. Article 5.14 § J of the Texas Business Corporation Act provides that the court may
order:
(a) the domestic or foreign corporation to pay the expenses of the plaintiff
incurred in the proceeding if it finds that the proceeding has resulted in a
substantial benefit to the domestic or foreign corporation; (b) the plaintiff to
pay the expenses of the domestic or foreign corporation or any defendant
incurred in investigating and defending the proceeding if it finds that the
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for
an improper purpose; or (c) a party to pay the expenses incurred by another
party (including the domestic or foreign corporation) because of the filing of
a pleading, motion, or other paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion, or
other paper (i) was not well grounded in fact after reasonable inquiry, (ii)
was not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law, or (iii) was interposed for an im-
proper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation.
TEX. Bus. CORP. Ac-r ANN. art. 5.14, § J(1) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005).
73. Id. § J(2).
74. See id. § J(1)(a); Rowe v. Rowe, 887 S.W.2d 191, 198 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1994, writ denied) ("Attorney's fees are only recoverable by a successful plaintiff in a
shareholder's derivative suit."); see also Bayoud v. Bayoud, 797 S.W.2d 304, 315 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
75. TEX. Bus. CORP. Acr ANN. art. 5.14, § J(1)(c) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2005).
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cause or for an improper purpose." 76
The phrase "without reasonable cause" is not defined in the statute,
but the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston has adopted an
objective standard that a plaintiff acts without reasonable cause,
if, at the time he brings suit: (1) plaintiff's claims in the lawsuit are
not warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law; or (2) plaintiff's allega-
tions in the suit are not well-grounded in fact after reasonable
inquiry.77
Applying this objective standard, the Houston Court of Appeals found
legally and factually sufficient evidence to support a trial court's finding
that certain plaintiffs brought a derivative action without reasonable
cause.78 Significant for the purposes of this finding was the fact that the
only claim with apparent merit was not included in the original com-
plaint.79 The court found the original claims related solely to allegations
which the plaintiffs had not tested or properly evaluated. 80 As a result,
the finding of no reasonable cause was upheld as proper.
81
Additionally, the corporation-like the derivative plaintiff in the case
of the corporation's filings-can recover fees from the derivative plaintiff
under Article 5.14J(1)(c) for specific improper filings by the derivative
plaintiff.82 Thus, the statute appears to grant the corporation the right to
test all of the pleadings, motions, and other papers filed by the derivative
plaintiff to determine if any such filing: "(i) was not well grounded in fact
after reasonable inquiry; (ii) was not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law;
or (iii) was interposed for an improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
83
76. See id. § J(1)(b). The previous version of Article 5.14 was somewhat ambiguous
with respect to whether the court or the jury should ultimately decide whether the pro-
ceeding was brought without reasonable cause. Econ. Gas, Inc. v. Burke, No. 14-93-01016-
CV, 1996 WL 220903, at *11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] May 2, 1996, writ denied)
(concurring and dissenting opinion) ("[T]he statute, by its plain and unambiguous terms,
allows 'a finding' of reasonable cause to be made by the court or jury.") However, the
1997 amendments to the statute make clear that the court, not the jury, is to make such a
determination. See Campbell v. Walker, No. 14-96-01425-CV, 2000 WL 19143, at *3-6
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 13, 2000, no pet.) (holding determination to be
made by court).
77. Bass v. Walker, 99 S.W.3d 877, 885 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 885-86.
80. Id. at 886.
81. Id. at 888.




2. Recovering Attorneys' Fees in Connection with the Sale or Issuance
of a Security
a. Article 581-33
Article 581-33(A)(2) of the Texas Securities Act ("TSA") creates liabil-
ity for sellers of securities under certain circumstances.8 4 Similarly, a
buyer is liable to the seller under Article 581-33(B) of the TSA when he
buys securities "by means of an untrue statement of a material fact or
omission to state a material fact,"'85 and pursuant to both sections of Arti-
cle 581-33, the injured party may be awarded court costs and reasonable
and necessary attorneys' fees to the extent the court considers such award
"equitable." 86
b. Article 581-33-1
The TSA also creates liability for the activities of investment advisors
and their representatives.8 7 Under Article 581-33-1, investment advisors
who engage in fraud or fraudulent practices in rendering their services
are liable to the purchaser for damages, including, "to the extent the
court considers equitable, court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees."188
3. Recovering Fees in Insurance-Related Cases
There are three widely-utilized statutes providing for the award of at-
torneys' fees to insured parties when an insurer is found to have engaged
in certain prohibited acts.89
84. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(A)(2) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 2005). In
relevant part this section states:
A person who offers or sells a security.., by means of an untrue statement
of a material fact or an omission to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they are made, not misleading, is liable to the person buying the security
from him, who may sue either at law or equity for rescission, or for damages
if the buyer no longer owns the security.
85. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33(B) (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 2005).
86. Id. art. 581-33(D)(7).
87. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-33-1 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 2005).
88. Id.
89. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. §§ 54.001-.454, 542.001-.014, 542.051-.061 (Vernon Supp.
2005). Recovery of attorneys' fees may also be allowed to an insured or insurer for breach
of the insurance contract. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 1997 &
Supp. 2005). In Texas, an insurance agreement constitutes a "written contract." See Bar-
nett v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 663, 665 (Tex. 1987). Section 38.006 provides that
"[tihis chapter does not apply to a contract issued by an insurer that is subject to the
provisions of ... (4) Article 21.21, Insurance Code, or (5) The Unfair Claim Settlement
Practices Act (Article 21.21-2, Insurance Code)." TEX. Civ. PRAC. REM. CODE ANN.
§ 38.006 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005). However, on certification from the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court clarified that Texas courts
should follow "established and longstanding Texas authority that interprets
[S]ection 38.006 to allow recovery of attorney's fees in a successful breach-of-contract ac-
tion against an insurer unless attorney's fees are otherwise available." Grapevine Excava-
tion, Inc. v. Md. Lloyds, 35 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. 2000).
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a. Recovering Attorneys' Fees for an Insurers' Failure to Promptly
Pay Claims
Sections 542.051 through 542.061 of the Texas Insurance Code establish
procedures for the prompt payment of insurance claims and create a pri-
vate right of action for an insured against an insurer that fails to promptly
respond to and pay for claims by insured parties. 90 The damages recover-
able by an insured pursuant to these sections include a discretionary
award of "reasonable attorneys' fees." 91
For an insurer to be liable under sections 542.051 through 542.061 for
failing to respond to or pay a claim promptly, the insured party must es-
tablish three elements: (1) that there is a claim under the insurance pol-
icy, (2) that the insurer is liable for the claim, and (3) that the insurer
failed to follow one or more sections with respect to the claim.92 While
Texas courts have held that sections 542.051 through 542.061 should be
construed broadly so as to provide the maximum protection for the in-
sured party,93 no recovery is allowed without a clear finding that coverage
existed under the underlying policy and that the insurer is liable on the
relevant claim.94 Further, the statute defines the term "claim" narrowly
as "a first party claim made by an insured or a policyholder under an
insurance policy . . . that must be paid by the insurer directly to the in-
sured or beneficiary. ' 95 Thus, at least explicitly, third party claims-for
instance, claims made against an insurer for indemnity against a third
party-may not be subject to coverage. 96 Texas appellate courts are split
as to whether an insured's defense costs constitute a "first party claim"
subject to section 542.051 through 542.061 with at least one court apply-
ing the sections to an insured's claim for a defense 97 and one court refus-
90. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.051-.061 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The Texas Legislature
enacted a non-substantive recodification of the insurance code. As a result, former Article
21.55 is recodified as sections 542.051-.061 effective April 1, 2005. See Tex. H.B. 2922, 78th
Leg., R.S. (2003) (codified at TEX. INS. CODE. §§ 542.051-.061).
91. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 542.060 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
92. See id.
93. See DeLeon v. Lloyd's London, Certain Underwriters, 259 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir.
2001).
94. See Evergreen Nat'l Indem. Co. v. Tan It All, Inc., 111 S.W.3d 669, 678-79 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2003, no pet.); Breshears v. State Farm Lloyds, 155 S.W.3d 340, 344-45 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied) (refusing to award attorneys' fees where insur-
ance company "complied with the insurance code and provided a reasonable payment
within a reasonable time").
95. TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 542.051 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
96. But see Ernest Martin, Jr., Article 21.21 and Other Statutory Claims: Staying on Top
of New Developments, available at http://www.haynesandboone.com (Mar. 30, 2001). Mr.
Martin argues that some claims of an insured party under a commercial general liability
policy are actually first party claims that should be covered under former Article 21.21.
This view has case support. See, e.g., Luxury Living, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., No.
H-02-3166, 2003 WL 22116202, at *20-21 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2003) ("Mid-Continent has a
duty to defend Luxury and to reimburse Luxury for its reasonable defense costs to date in
the underlying lawsuit, including statutory penalty under [A]rticle 21.55 of the Texas Insur-
ance Code, along with reasonable attorneys' fees in this action.").
97. See N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 84 S.W.3d 314, 318-19 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 2002, pet. granted) (applying former Article 21.55 to an insured's claim for
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
ing to apply them.98
If an insurer wrongfully rejects a claim, the insurer may be liable for
statutory damages, including attorneys' fees.9 9 Even in cases involving
coverage interpretation questions where "reasonable minds may differ,"
an insurer runs the risk of incurring statutory penalties and attorneys'
fees if the court concludes the claim should not have been rejected. 1°°
b. Recovering Attorneys' Fees For An Insurer's Unfair
Competition and Unfair Practices
Sections 541.001 through 541.454 of the Texas Insurance Code provide
for an insured to recover his or her "reasonable and necessary" attorneys'
fees, in the discretion of the trial court, if the insurer is found to have
engaged in unfair competition and practices, including misleading adver-
tising, unfair settlement of the insured party's claims, or misrepresenting
the contents of an insurance policy. 10 1 Several factors are relevant to the
determination whether the award of attorneys' fees pursuant to sections
541.001 through 541.454 are reasonable and necessary, one of the most
important of which is the amount of damages ultimately awarded. 10 2
Conversely, the defendant insurer can recover its reasonable and nec-
essary attorneys' fees in an action brought against it if it shows the action
brought "was groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of
harassment. ' 10 3 An insurer seeking fees under this section must provide
the court with a basis to conclude that the insurer spent time dedicated
solely to defending the insured's groundless claim as distinguished from
time defending the insured's claims for recovery under the policy.10 4
defense), rev'd on other grounds, 140 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2004). On review, the Texas Su-
preme Court concluded that the insurer's conduct did not violate the terms of former Arti-
cle 21.55 and therefore did not address whether the scope of Article 21.55 encompassed an
insured's claim for defense. See N. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davalos, 140 S.W.3d 685, 691
(Tex. 2004).
98. See TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 242 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2004, pet. denied) (holding that "the legislature did not intend the deadlines and
penalties of Article 21.55 to apply to claims for a defense").
99. E & R Rubalcava Constr., Inc. v. Burlington Ins. Co., 148 F. Supp. 2d 746, 750
(N.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that insured party is entitled to attorneys' fees award from in-
surer under former Article 21.55) (citing Teate v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 965 F. Supp.
891, 893 (E.D. Tex. 1997)). An insurer's wrongful rejection of a claim may be also consid-
ered a delay in payment for the purposes of Article 21.55. Id.; see also Nat'l Am. Ins. Co.
v. Columbia Packing Co., No. 3-02-CV-0909-BD, 2003 WL 21516586, at *7 (N.D. Tex.
Apr. 7, 2003) ("The wrongful rejection of a claim, even if made in good faith, may be
considered a delay .... ).
100. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal 120 S.W.3d 493, 497 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no
pet. h.).
101. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.151 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
102. See, e.g., Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Int'l Supply Co, 759 S.W.2d 697, 703-04 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1988, writ denied) (detailing twelve factors normally used in determining reasona-
bleness of an award of attorneys' fees).
103. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.153 (Vernon Supp. 2005).
104. See Ridglea Estate Condo. Ass'n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 851, 860
(N.D. Tex. 2004) vacated on other grounds, 398 F.3d 332 (5th Cir. Tex. 2005) (upholding
denial of insurer's requests for attorneys' fees under former Article 21.21 because
"[n]othing [had] been provided that would allow the court to conclude that any significant
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c. Recovery of Attorneys' Fees for an Insurer's Unfair Claim
Settlement Practices
Sections 542.001 through 542.014 of the Texas Insurance Code now
provide for the recovery of attorneys' fees by an insured if the insurer is
found to have engaged in unfair claim settlement practices, such as know-
ingly making misrepresentations to claimants, failing to investigate claims
properly, or failing to settle certain claims properly. 105 As noted by the
Texas Supreme Court, former "[A]rticle 21.21 now expressly incorporates
the unfair settlement practice defined in [A]rticle 21.21-2,"106 and estab-
lishes liability if the insured shows "(1) the policy covers the claim, (2) the
insured's liability is reasonably clear, (3) the claimant has made a proper
settlement demand within policy limits, and (4) the demand's terms are
such that an ordinarily prudent insurer would accept it. ' ' 107 Further,
"[a]lthough Article 21.21-2 does not itself create a private cause of ac-
tion," the Texas Supreme Court has held "that conduct violating Article
21.21-2 [i]s actionable under Article 21.21."108
4. Recovering Fees in Intellectual Property Cases
Chapter 16 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code provides for the
recovery of attorneys' fees in certain trademark infringement matters. 10 9
Section 16.25 allows a litigant who believes he will be damaged by the
registration of a trademark to bring suit to cancel such registration.110 If
the court decides that the losing party in a case arising under this section
"should have known his position was without merit, the court may award
the successful party his reasonable attorneys' fees and charge them as a
part of the costs against the losing party."'11
Similarly, section 16.28 of the Code allows a Texas court to, in its dis-
cretion, award attorneys' fees when a party is found to have knowingly
made a fraudulent representation when applying for a trademark11 2 or
procured an application or registration by false or fraudulent means.11 3
time has been devoted by [the insurer] to defense of [the insured's] [Airticle 21.21 claims
as distinguished from [the insured's] claims for recovery under the policy").
105. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 542.001-.014 (Vernon Supp. 2005) (formerly Article
21.21-2).
106. Rocor Int'l, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 77 S.W.3d 253, 268 (Tex.
2002) (finding no violation of former Article 21.21 because injured third party never made
proper settlement demand within policy limits).
107. Id. at 255.
108. Id. at 258-59.
109. As set forth below, Texas law provides for the recovery of attorney's fees in certain
trademark related cases. Reasonable attorneys' fees may also be recoverable in trade
secrets cases when the claim arises as a breach of contract, subject to all of the limitations
described in Section 38.001. See Murrco Agency, Inc. v. Ryan, 800 S.W.2d 600, 606 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.25(a) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
111. Id. § 16.25(d) (emphasis added).
112. Id. § 16.28(a).
113. Id. § 16.28(b)(1). Federal law also provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees in
certain intellectual property matters. See Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, 15
U.S.C.A. § 1117(a) (West 1998); 35 U.S.C.A § 285 (West 1994).
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5. Recovering Fees in Antitrust Cases
The Texas Free Enterprise and Antitrust Act of 1983 ("TFEAA") pro-
vides for the recovery of attorneys' fees to "[a]ny person or governmental
entity" whose "business or property has been injured by reason of any
conduct declared unlawful" under the TFEAA. n' 4
The award of "costs of suit, including reasonable attorney's fees" is
mandatory under the TFEAA, but a prerequisite to this recovery is an
award of actual damages under the statute. 1 5 However, the TFEAA ex-
pressly provides for the award of attorneys' fees in favor of a party who
substantially prevails on the merits of his or her suit for injunctive relief
under the TFEAA. 116 Importantly, section 15.21(a)(2) precludes a party
from recovering damages under the TFEAA when a judgment has been
obtained under federal antitrust law and the state TFEAA action is based
upon substantially the same conduct which was the subject of the federal
suit.117 The TFEAA also provides for the mandatory award of "reasona-
ble attorney's fee, courts costs and other reasonable expenses of litiga-
tion" if an action is found by the court to be groundless, brought in bad
faith, or brought for the purpose of harassment.1 1 8
114. In relevant part, Section 15.21(a)(1) of the TFEAA provides
Any person or governmental entity, including the State of Texas and any of
its political subdivisions or tax-supported institutions, whose business or
property has been injured by reason of any conduct declared unlawful in
Subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 15.05 of this Act may sue any person,
other than a municipal corporation . . .. and shall recover actual damages
sustained, interest on actual damages ... and the cost of suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee; provided, however, that if the trier of fact finds
that the unlawful conduct was willful or flagrant, it shall increase the recov-
ery to threefold the damages sustained and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee ....
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(a)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005). Federal anti-
trust laws, including the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and the Robinson-Patman Act, also
provide for the award of attorney's fees. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (West 2002).
115. See Chapman Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Franks, 732 S.W.2d 737, 743 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1987, no writ); Perritt Co. v. Mitchell, 663 S.W.2d 696, 699 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
116. In relevant part, section 15.21(b) of the TFEAA provides
Any person or governmental entity, including the State of Texas and any of
its political subdivisions or tax-supported institutions, whose business or
property is threatened with injury by reason of anything declared unlawful in
Subsection (a), (b), or (c) of Section 15.05 of this Act may sue any person,
other than a municipal corporation,... to enjoin the unlawful practice tem-
porarily or permanently .... In any such suit in which the plaintiff substan-
tially prevails on the merits, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee based on the fair market value
of the attorney services used.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.21(b) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
117. In relevant part, Section 15.21(a)(2) of the TFEAA provides:
Any person or governmental entity who obtains a judgment for damages
under 15 U.S.C. § 15 or any other provision of federal law comparable to this
subsection may not recover damages in a suit under this subsection based on
substantially the same conduct that was the subject of the federal suit.
Id. § 15.21(a)(2).
118. In relevant part, section 15.21(a)(3) of the TFEAA, provides: "On a finding by the
court that an action under this section was groundless or brought in bad faith or for the
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6. Recovering Fees to Enforce Covenants Not to Compete
Chapter 15 of the Texas Business and Commerce Code also permits, in
the discretion of the trial court, the recovery of attorneys' fees incurred
by an employer in defending an action to enforce a covenant not to com-
pete, 119 and permits, also in the discretion of the trial court, an employee
who has entered into an unreasonable covenant not to compete to re-
cover fees incurred in defending against his or her employer 120 -both
recovery provisions fall within the ambit of the Covenant Not to Com-
pete Act.121
As with the other statutes addressed in this article, there is generally a
duty-absent a showing that claims are intertwined -to segregate fees
attributable to claims arising under the Covenant Not to Compete Act
from those not covered by the Act.122 The limited number of cases inter-
purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant or defendants a reasonable
attorney's fee, court costs, and other reasonable expenses of litigation." Id. § 15.21(a)(3).
119. In relevant part, section 15.51(c) of the code provides:
If the primary purpose of the agreement to which the covenant is ancillary is
to obligate the promisor to render personal services .... the agreement that
the covenant did not contain limitations as to time, geographical area, and
scope of activity to be restrained that were reasonable and the limitations
imposed a greater restraint than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee, and the promisee sought to enforce the
covenant to a greater extent than was necessary to protect the goodwill or
other business interest of the promisee, the court may award the promisor
the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees, actually and reasonably in-
curred by the promisor in defending the action to enforce the covenant.
Id. § 15.51(b).
120. In relevant part, Section 15.51(c) of the Code provides:
If the covenant is found to be ancillary to or part of an otherwise enforceable
agreement but contains limitations as to time, geographical area, or scope of
activity to be restrained that are not reasonable and impose a greater re-
straint than is necessary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of
the promisee, the court shall reform the covenant to the extent necessary to
cause the limitations contained in the covenant as to time, geographical area,
and scope of activity to be restrained to be reasonable and to impose a re-
straint that is not greater than necessary to protect the goodwill or other
business interest of the promisee and enforce the covenant as reformed, ex-
cept that the court may not award the promisee damages for a breach of the
covenant before its reformation and the relief granted to the promisee shall
be limited to injunctive relief. If the primary purpose of the agreement to
which the covenant is ancillary is to obligate the promisor to render personal
services, the promisor establishes that the promisee knew at the time of the
execution of the agreement that the covenant did not contain limitations as
to time, geographical area, and scope of activity to be restrained that were
reasonable and the limitations imposed a greater restraint than necessary to
protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, and the
promisee sought to enforce the covenant to a greater extent than was neces-
sary to protect the goodwill or other business interest of the promisee, the
court may award the promisor the costs, including reasonable attorney's fees,
actually and reasonably incurred by the promisor in defending the action to
enforce the covenant.
Id. § 15.51 (emphasis added); see Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 124
S.W.3d 678, 688-89 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. granted).
121. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.51 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
122. Emergicare Sys. Corp. v. Bourdon, 942 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex. App.-Eastland
1997, no writ). In an action involving more than one covenant not to compete where one
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preting section 15.51's attorneys' fees provision have strictly construed
the statute. 123
E. RECOVERING FEES FOR DEFENDING AGAINST
GROUNDLESS PLEADINGS
Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code permits a party to
recover attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against groundless
pleadings. 124 A pleading is groundless when it (1) is presented for an
improper purpose, (2) is not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivo-
lous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law
or new law, or (3) contains unsupportable factual contentions. 125 If a
pleading fails to meet any of these three criteria and was filed without
proper due diligence, Chapter 10 allows the aggrieved party to file a mo-
tion for sanctions and recover all expenses resulting from the subject liti-
gation including attorneys' fees. 126
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 also allows recovery of attorneys' fees
to a party forced to defend against baseless pleadings. Under Rule 13,
the moving party must demonstrate that the claims filed were both objec-
tively groundless-either lacking legal or evidentiary support-and that
such claims were also brought in bad faith or for the purposes of harass-
covenant is found valid and the other void, the court in Butts Retail, Inc. v. Diversifoods,
Inc., 840 S.W.2d 770 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1992, writ denied) held that remand was nec-
essary to determine what portion of the awarded attorneys' fees were attributable to the
enforcement of a valid covenant not to compete and what portion was not recoverable for
the enforcement of a covenant found to be void and unenforceable such that segregation
could be accomplished. Id. at 774-75 (citing Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Arkla
Equip. Co., 528 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1975)); see also Pelto Oil Co. v. CSX Oil & Gas
Corp., 804 S.W.2d 583, 588 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Indus. Dis-
posal Supply Co. v. Perryman Bros. Trash Serv., Inc., 664 S.W.2d 756, 761 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
123. See Perez v. Tex. Disposal Sys., Inc., 53 S.W.3d 480, 482-83 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 80 S.W.3d 593 (Tex. 2002). The appellate court
found that section 15.51's "silence on whether an employer can recover attorney's fees if a
covenant not to compete has been reformed is significant because of the specificity with
which section 15.51 addresses the recovery available to employers and employees in an
action to enforce a covenant not to compete," and therefore held that "[i]f the covenant
not to compete does not meet the section 15.50 criteria and the trial court reforms the
covenant, a court may award an employer injunctive relief only." Id. (emphasis added)
(citing Peat Marwick Main & Co. v. Haass, 818 S.W.2d 381, 388 (Tex. 1991)). The Texas
Supreme Court stated, in the context of addressing an illegal restraint of trade argument,
that the Covenant Not to Compete Act's preemption provision "makes clear that the
[Texas] Legislature intended the Covenant Not to Compete Act to largely supplant the
Texas common law relating to enforcement of covenants not to compete," and thus the
strict construction of Section 15.51 in this supplemental opinion is not without precedent.
Light v. Centel Cellular Co. of Tex., 883 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Tex. 1994).
124. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.001-.006 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2005).
125. See id. § 10.001.
126. See id. § 10.002; see also Income Adm'r Servs., Inc. v. Payne, No. 03-01-00283-CV,
2002 WL 220038, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin Feb. 14, 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for
publication) (upholding sanctions award under Chapter 10 in the amount of $165,136.95
representing the reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by defendants to defend
the case through trial).
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ment. 127 If the moving party overcomes the presumption that the claims
were brought in good faith,128 the court may award an appropriate sanc-
tion including attorneys' fees. 129
F. RECOVERING FEES IN CLASS ACTION CASES
a. Amendments to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42
During the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court adopted several
amendments to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42 governing class ac-
tions.130 Newly adopted Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 42(h) specifies the
procedure for determining an award of attorneys' fees in class actions:
PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING ATTORNEY FEES AWARD. In an ac-
tion certified as a class action, the court may award attorney fees in
accordance with subdivision (i) and nontaxable costs authorized by
law or by agreement of the parties as follows:
(1) Motion for Award of Attorney Fees. A claim for an award of
attorney fees and nontaxable costs must be made by motion,
subject to the provisions of this subdivision, at a time set by the
court. Notice of the motion must be served on all parties and,
for motions by class counsel, directed to class members in a rea-
sonable manner.
(2) Objections to Motion. A class member, or a party from whom
payment is sought, may object to the motion.
(3) Hearing and Findings. The court must hold a hearing in open
court and must find the facts and state its conclusions of law on
the motion. The court must state its findings and conclusions in
writing or orally on the record.131
Because this new rule only provides the court with the ability to award
fees "authorized by law or by agreement" it does not appear to create
new grounds for an award of attorneys' fees. 132
127. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13. To recover attorneys' fees under Chapter 10, the movant does
not need to establish that the claims were brought in bad faith or for the purposes of
harassment. See Bug Master Exterminating Serv., Inc. v Abash Exterminating, Inc., No.
03-02-00048-CV, 2002 WL 31890819, at *2 (Tex. App.-Austin Dec. 31, 2002, no pet.) (not
designated for publication) (holding no showing of bad faith or improper purpose required
for sanctions under TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 10.001(2), 10.001(3) (Vernon 2002 &
Supp. 2005)).
128. TEX. R. Civ. P. 13 ("Courts shall presume that pleadings, motions, and other pa-
pers are filed in good faith."); GTE Communications Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725,
731 (Tex. 1993) (holding "burden is on party moving for sanctions to overcome" presump-
tion of good faith).
129. Gorman v. Gorman, 966 S.W.2d 858, 867-68 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998,
pet. denied) (affirming trial court's sanction of attorney's fees under Rule 13).
130. See Tex. Sup. Ct. Order dated Oct. 9, 2003 (Misc. Docket No. 03-9160).
131. TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(h).
132. Rule 42(h) substantially mirrors its federal counterpart, Rule 23(h), which pro-
vides, in relevant part that "[i]n an action certified as a class action, the court may award
reasonable attorney fees and nontaxable costs authorized by law or by agreement" of the
party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(h). The 2003 Notes of the Advisory Committee concerning
subdivision 23(h) state "[t]his subdivision does not undertake to create new grounds for an
award of attorneys fees or nontaxable costs."
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Newly adopted Rule 42(i) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires the "lodestar" method be used to calculate attorneys' fees for class
counsel.133 Rule 42(i) provides:
(a) In awarding attorney fees, the court must first determine a lode-
star figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably worked
time a reasonable hourly rate. The attorney fees must be in the
range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar figure. In making these deter-
minations, the court must consider the factors specified in Rule
1.04(b), Tex. Disciplinary R. Prof. Conduct.134
This rule expressly allows Texas courts to use a multiplier to enhance
fees awarded to class counsel. 135 The trial court is limited, however, by a
ceiling of four times the lodestar and a floor of twenty-five percent of the
lodestar. 136
Prior to the adoption of this rule and the enactment of section 26.003 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, the trial court had discre-
tion to use either the percentage method or the lodestar method in
awarding class action fees.137 This rule impliedly overrules previous
Texas authority that permitted an attorneys' fee award to class counsel
based on the "percentage method. ' 138
133. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(i). Rule 42(i) only applies in actions filed after September
1, 2003. TEX. R. Civ. P. 420). This amendment to Rule 42 was, in part, mandated by Rule
26.002 of the Texas Civil Practices and Remedies Code, which required the Texas Supreme
Court to adopt rules that "comply with the mandatory guidelines established by this chap-
ter." TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 26.002 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Those
mandatory guidelines include Rule 26.003, which provides as follows:
(a) If an award of attorney's fees is available under applicable substantive
law, the rules adopted under this chapter must provide that the trial court
shall use the Lodestar method to calculate the amount of attorneys' fees to
be awarded class counsel. The rules may give the trial court discretion to
increase or decrease the fee award calculated by using the Lodestar method
by no more than four times based on specified factors.
(b) Rules adopted under this chapter must provide that in a class action, if
any portion of the benefits recovered for the class are in the form of coupons
or other noncash common benefits, the attorney's fees awarded in the action
must be in cash and noncash amounts in the same proportion as the recovery
for the class.
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 26.003 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
134. The factors specified in Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.04 are
discussed more fully in Section III infra.
135. VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 870 (Tex. App.-
Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied).
136. Also, objectors to a class action settlement "are not ordinarily awarded attorneys'
fees, except where their efforts have conferred benefits on the class members generally, as
distinguished from the objectors themselves particular." Johnson v. Scott, 113 S.W.3d 366,
377 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied) (quoting Duhaime v. John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co., 2 F. Supp. 2d 175, 176 (D. Mass. 1998)). As the Beaumont Court of Appeals
noted, "pursuing a parallel case is not enough to require an award of attorneys' fees."
Johnson, 113 S.W.3d at 377 (holding trial court did not abuse discretion in denying fees to
objectors counsel who pursued argument that benefited class as whole).
137. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960-61 (Tex. 1996) ("Both the
percentage method and the lodestar method have their strengths and weaknesses, depend-
ing on the facts of the case."); Frost Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Constr. Co.,
110 S.W.3d 41, 43-44, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
138. See Gen. Motors Corp., 916 S.W.2d at 960.
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An equally significant change in practice is the adoption of Rule
42(i)(b) requiring class counsel to be compensated through cash and non-
cash benefits in equal proportion to the cash and non-cash benefits re-
ceived by the class as consideration. It is, of course, extremely rare for
counsel to accept non-cash benefits, but quite common for class members
to be compensated with some non-cash benefit. 139
b. The Lodestar Method
The lodestar method calculates attorneys' fees by "multiplying the
number of hours expended by the attorneys by an appropriate hourly rate
determined by a variety of factors, such as the benefits obtained for the
[client], the complexity of the issues involved, the expertise of counsel,
the preclusion of other legal work due to the acceptance of the ... suit,
and the hourly rate customarily charged in the region for similar
work.' 140 The resulting number is called a lodestar, presumably because
the number provides a guiding point-or lodestar-in the determination
of an appropriate award. 14 1
After the lodestar is calculated, the court may, in its discretion, apply a
multiplier to determine the ultimate amount of attorneys' fees to be
awarded.' 42 Multipliers are determined by factors such as the complexity
of the case, the skill of the attorney, the amount of recovery, and the
contingent nature of the case;' 43 these factors vary from case to case.' 44
139. See Stassi v. Boone, No. GN200180, 2003 WL 21436995, at *21 (Tex. Dist. Ct. June
6, 2003) (unpublished opinion).
140. Gen. Motors Corp., 916 S.W.2d at 960 (holding that lodestar is determined by mul-
tiplying number of hours reasonably spent by an hourly rate court deems reasonable for
similarly complex, non-contingent work). Cf. County of Dallas v. Wiland, 124 S.W.3d 390,
403 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted); Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. v. Flores,
955 S.W.2d 861, 870 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.) (holding the same); Crouch
v. Tenneco, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993, writ denied) (holding same);
City of Dallas v. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d 942, 956 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied) (hold-
ing the same).
141. See Hon. Scott A. Brister, Proof of Attorneys' Fees in Texas, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
313, 327 (1993).
142. See Guity v. C.C.I. Enter., Co., 54 S.W.3d 526, 528-29 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (remanding case for evaluation of reasonable fee).
143. See Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 956; Crouch, 853 S.W.2d at 647. When determining
whether to make an upward or downward adjustment to the lodestar, courts commonly
examine twelve factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions; (3) the level of skill required; (4) the effect on other employment by
the attorney; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent;
(7) the time limitations imposed by the client or the ability of the attorney;
(8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputa-
tion, and ability of the attorney; (10) the undesirability of the case; (11) the
nature and length of the attorney's relationship with the client; and (12)
awards in similar cases.
See Wiland, 124 S.W.3d at 403 (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714,
717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)).
144. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 412-13 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso
2002, pet. denied) (affirming a multiplier of 2.0 for a case "involving novel and difficult
issues" such that the controlling federal case law made the case "not just an uphill battle,
but an exercise in windmill tilling"); see also Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 823
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As long as the resulting fee is not unreasonable, the amount of the multi-
plier is largely determined at the discretion of the trial court, and Rule
43(i) authorizes this lodestar amount to be both increased or decreased.
G. RECOVERING FEES ON OTHER EQUITABLE GROUNDS
Notwithstanding the general rule in Texas that attorneys' fees are re-
coverable only if a contractual or statutory provision so permits, equita-
ble principles may allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees if a party is
required to prosecute or defend a suit because of the "wrongful act" of its
opponent.145 For example, a party may be able to recover reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees and expenses as damages when the defendant's
wrongful conduct forced the plaintiff to prosecute or defend another pro-
ceeding. 146 Texas courts have also equitably extended section 38.001 (au-
thorizing the recovery of fees in breach of contract actions) to cover
certain claims sounding in tort.147
The common fund doctrine is the most widely recognized exception to
the general rule that, absent a statutory or contractual basis for an award
of attorneys' fees, each litigant must bear his own attorneys' fees.
148
Under the common fund doctrine, the court may allow reasonable attor-
neys' fees to a litigant who, at his own expense, maintains a suit that "cre-
ates a fund benefiting other parties as well as himself.
149
"The common fund doctrine is based on the principle that those receiv-
ing the benefits of the suit should bear their fair share of the ex-
(5th Cir. 1996) (affirming multiplier of 2.0); In re Terra-Drill P'ships Sec. Litig., 733
F. Supp. 1127, 1131 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (applying 2.5 multiplier).
145. See Massey v. Columbus State Bank, 35 S.W.3d 697, 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Baja Energy, Inc. v. Ball, 669 S.W.2d 836, 839 (Tex. App.-East-
land 1984, no writ); see also Brandtjen & Kluge v. Manney, 238 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Burnside Air Conditioning & Heating,
Inc. v. T.S. Young Corp., 113 S.W.3d 889, 898-99 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); Ed
Rachal Found. v. D'Unger, 117 S.W.3d 348, 357-58 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
filed) ("Neither the Texas Supreme Court nor this [court of appeals] has adopted any
wrongful-act exception to the general prohibition against recovery of attorneys' fees in a
tort claim, as we decline to do so in this case."); Pacesetter Pools, Inc. v. Pierce Homes,
Inc., 86 S.W.3d 827, 834 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); Martin-Simon v. Womack, 68
S.W.3d 793, 798 n.2 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied). Notably, while
several courts of appeal have adopted this exception, the Texas Supreme Court has not
done so. Ed Rachal Found., 117 S.W.3d at 357-58.
146. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 317 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, pet.
denied); see also Qwest Communications Int'l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 15, 32-33
(Tex. App.-Austin 2003, pet. filed), rev'd on other grounds, 167 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2005);
McCall v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 82 S.W.3d 337, 344 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001), rev'd on
other grounds, 104 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2003).
147. See Gill Sav. Ass'n v. Chair King, Inc., 797 S.W.2d 31, 31 (Tex. 1990); Tex. Beef
Cattle Co. v. Green, 883 S.W.2d 415, 430 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994), rev'd on other
grounds, 921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996).
148. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954; Tex. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Seals, 948 S.W.2d 532, 534 n.1
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, no writ).
149. Lancer Corp. v. Murillo, 909 S.W.2d 122, 126 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1995, no
writ) (citing Internal Imp. Fund Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 532-37 (1881)); see also
Knebel v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 518 S.W.2d 795, 799-801 (Tex. 1974).
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penses." 150 Attorneys' fees are allowed as a charge against the fund.151
An attorney's compensation from non-contracting plaintiffs under the
common fund doctrine is limited to the reasonable value of the attorney's
services benefiting them. 152 As long as the litigant has created a fund for
others, it need only establish that others have benefited to seek fees from
the fund based on the common fund doctrine.153 Because this doctrine
sounds in equity, courts have shown a reluctance to apply it as an alterna-
tive means of recovering attorneys' fees when recovery of fees is already
addressed by statute. 154 The common fund doctrine has generally been
utilized in class actions. 155 However, it is not expressly mentioned in the
new Rule 42(i).
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR THE RECOVERY OF
ATI'ORNEYS' FEES
Assuming that an attorney has the right-whether by contract, statute,
or in equity-to recover attorney's fees, the amount of the fee must be
"reasonable." A fee is unconscionable, and thus, unreasonable, "if a
competent lawyer could not form a reasonable belief that the fee is rea-
sonable .... The reasonableness of any fee depends on the circumstances
of the services. ' 156 Indeed, an award of attorneys' fees can be larger than
a litigants' recovery on its substantive claim and still be "reasonable" in
certain circumstances. 157
150. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954 (citing Greenough, 105 U.S. at 533-34; Knebel, 518
S.W.2d at 799).
151. Id. at 954-55. Cf. Valle v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 5 S.W.3d 745, 746-47
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
152. Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 955.
153. See Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 803-04 (Tex. App.-Waco 1997, no writ);
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Mo., Ky. & Tenn. Ry. Co. of Tex., 175 S.W. 816, 817 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1915, no writ).
154. Schindler v. Schindler, 119 S.W.3d 923, 933 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied)
(refusing to apply equitable principles of common fund doctrine in probate case because
the probate code provides a statutory basis for an award of fees); see also Bombardier
Aerospace Employee Welfare Benefits Plan v. Ferrer, Poirot & Wansbrough, 354 F.3d 348,
360-61 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding Texas common fund doctrine could not be used to recover
plan participant's legal costs from employee benefit plan governed by ERISA because plan
specified that "attorney's fees and court costs are the responsibility of the participant, not
the plan").
155. See, e.g., Crouch v. Tenneco, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. App.-Waco 1993,
writ denied) (upholding award of attorney's fees to class counsel on equitable principle of
"common fund"); Arnett, 762 S.W.2d at 954 (shareholder derivative suits); Bayliss v.
Cernock, 773 S.W.2d 384, 386-87 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ denied)
(shareholder derivative suits); Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 175 S.W. at 821 (insurance
subrogation).
156. Lopez v. Munoz, Hockema & Reed, L.L.P., 22 S.W.3d 857, 867 (Tex. 2000) (Gon-
zales, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The issue whether it is reasonable to
collect a fee is a separate determination.
157. See Hawkins v. Owens, No. 01-99-00918-CV, 2000 WL 1199254, at *9 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 24, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (awarding
attorneys' fees that were two and one-half times larger than amount paid and judgment
awarded, and over five and one-half times amount of $5,000 judgment for contract dam-
ages when "case was transformed from what should have been a simple suit on a loan
agreement to a lengthy, drawn-out battle extending from 1995 to 1999"); Flint & Assocs. v.
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Texas courts determine whether a fee is "reasonable" based upon the
factors specified in Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct
1.04.158 Those factors include:
1. the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the ques-
tions involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service
properly;
2. the likelihood.., that the acceptance of the particular employment
will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
3. the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
4. the amount involved and the results obtained;
5. the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
6. the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
7. the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services; and
8. whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncer-
tainty of collection before the legal services have been rendered.
159
Evidence of each of the factors is not required to support an attorneys'
fees award. 160 However, evidence of some of these factors must be pre-
sent to support an award. 161
Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ
denied) (attorneys' fees awarded nearly seven times actual damages).
158. The reasonableness of an attorneys' fee award is generally a jury question. See
City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 367-69 (Tex. 2000). However,
"expert testimony is necessary to establish the reasonableness of attorney's fees." Coca-
Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 312 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet.
granted).
159. TEX. DISCIPLINARY R. PROF'L CONDUCT 1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon Supp. 2005). See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Crowley,
899 S.W.2d 399, 403 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, orig. proceeding [leave denied])
("MCI's attorneys' fees in its defense of this case are 'patently irrelevant' and are not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."); see also Arthur
Andersen & Co., 945 S.W.2d at 818. The opposing party's attorneys' fees are not necessa-
rily relevant to the analysis. M.D. Mark, Inc. v. PIHI P'ship, No. 01-98-00724-CV, 2001
WL 619604, at *12-13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2001, no pet.) (not desig-
nated for publication). But see DiMiceli v. Affordable Pool Maint., Inc., 110 S.W.3d 164,
174 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, no pet.) (noting opposing counsel's testimony regard-
ing appellate fees in determining reasonableness of fees).
160. Burnside Air Conditioning & Heating, Inc. v. T.S. Young Corp., 113 S.W.3d 899,
899 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.); Columbia Rio Grande Reg'l Hosp. v. Stover, 17
S.W.3d 387, 397 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.); Herring v. Bocquet, 21 S.W.3d
367, 368 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2000, no pet.). The Amarillo Court of Appeals held
that the court can also consider "the entire record, the evidence presented on reasonable-
ness, the amount in controversy, the common knowledge of the participants as lawyers and
judges, and the relative success of the parties." Hagedorn v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 353
(Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
161. See Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P'ship v. Long Trusts, 134 S.W.3d 267, 287-88 (Tex.
App.-Tyler 2003, pet. denied) (holding fee award unreasonable based on lack of testi-
mony regarding Rule 1.04 factors); City of Weatherford v. Catron, 83 S.W.3d 261, 272-73
(Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (affirming award of fees where evidence was
presented on five of factors' jury questions included an instruction outlining factors, and
party requested a specific amount of fees); Hagedorn, 73 S.W.3d at 353; Sieber & Calicutt,
Inc. v. La Gloria Oil & Gas Co., 66 S.W.3d 340, 351 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied)
(upholding trial court's denial of fee award where there was no evidence to support any of
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A. THE ANDERSEN STANDARD
The most oft cited Texas case regarding the reasonableness of contin-
gent fee awards is Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp.
162
According to Andersen, a trial court cannot award attorneys' fees purely
on evidence of a percentage fee agreement. 163 Instead, the Court held
that a trial court must take into consideration all of the Rule 1.04 factors
when making an award of attorneys' fees.
164
In VingCard A.S. v. Merrimac Hospitality Systems, Inc., the Fort Worth
Court of Appeals, interpreting Andersen, held that an attorney can still
request that the jury calculate attorneys' fees as a percentage of damages
awarded. 165 Because the jury in that case "was free to reject his re-
quested percentages under the issue submitted, which required them to
award only a specific dollar amount," the award was held not to violate
the principles articulated by the Texas Supreme Court in Andersen.
166
The percentage in VingCard was based upon the Rule 1.04 factors.
167
B. APPLYING THE RULE 1.04 FACTORS
As stated, Andersen demands that the Rule 1.04 factors be considered
in calculating a reasonable fee.' 6 8 Although one of the Rule 1.04 factors
requires consideration of "the results obtained," a recent opinion from
the Houston Court of Appeals confirms that a party cannot escape an
award of attorneys' fees solely by arguing that the fees awarded are ex-
cessive as compared to the damages awarded. In C.M. Asfahl Agency v.
Tensor, Inc.,169 the plaintiff prevailed on its underlying breach of contract
claim and was awarded $906,793.90 in actual damages and additional
damages of $518,686.10 under the Sales Representative Act.170 The jury
1.04 factors); M.D. Mark, Inc., 2001 WL 619604, at *12-13; Aquila S.W. Pipeline, Inc. v.
Harmony Exploration, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 240-41 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet.
denied.).
162. 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997). Andersen dealt specifically with the award of
attorneys' fees in a DTPA action. However, courts have applied Andersen's holding to all
proceedings when the attorneys' fees are "shifted from one party to the other." Jackson
Law Office, P.C. v. Chappell, 37 S.W.3d 15, 24 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2000, pet. denied).
163. Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818; see also San Antonio Credit Union v. O'Connor, 115
S.W.3d 82, 106 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (finding evidence insufficient
to uphold fee award because "a party seeking fees must ask the jury to award fees in a
specific dollar amount"); Infonova Solutions, Inc. v. Griggs, No. 04-22-00255-CV, 2003 WL
21467091, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 25, 2003, no pet.) (affirming denial of fees
when only evidence of fees in record was contingency fee contract); Seacoast, Inc. v.
LaCouture, No. 03-96-00506-CV, 1998 WL 29966, at *8 (Tex. App.-Austin Jan. 29, 1998,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (reversing fee award where evidence support-
ing attorneys' fee award consisted of attorney and client testifying to terms of contingent
fee agreement).
164. Andersen, 945 S.W.2d at 818.
165. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 870; see also Frost Crushed Stone Co. v. Odell Geer Con-
str. Co., 110 S.W.3d 41, 47-48 (Tex. App.-Waco 2002, no pet.).
166. VingCard, 59 S.W.3d at 870.
167. Id.
168. Andersen, 945 S.W.2d 812 at 818.
169. 135 S.W.3d 768, 802 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
170. Id. at 775.
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also awarded $1,328,922.00 in attorneys' fees and certain defendants ap-
pealed. 171 The defendants' "chief complaint in challenging the award as
excessive was that it did not bear a reasonable relationship to the dam-
ages awarded.' 1 72 In upholding the award of attorneys' fees, the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals noted that the "reasonable relationship" factor
alone was not conclusive. 173 Instead, the court focused on expert testi-
mony concerning the magnitude and complexity of the case that included
a protracted discovery process that produced 93,000 documents and was
"vigorously contested.' 1 74 The court also noted that, in the opinion of
the expert, retained counsel's $185.00 per hour billing rate was below the
market rate given the retained counsel's services, experience, and
expertise. 75
The Texarkana Court of Appeals also recently discussed the need for
clarity in documentation submitted by counsel in support of this Rule
1.04 consideration. 176 In Rolling Lands Investment, L.C. v. Northwest
Airport Management, L.P., the Texarkana Court of Appeals remanded
for a determination of reasonableness and necessity of the litigant's fees
despite the submission of a thorough and uncontroverted affidavit in sup-
port of the party's fee request. 177 The affidavit contained expert testi-
mony that the fees were, in the affiant's opinion and based on the
affiant's twenty years of experience in commercial litigation, reasonable
and necessary. 178 It also stated that the affiant took into consideration
the usual and customary fees in the location of the services, the amount in
controversy, the legal questions involved, the fee arrangement with the
client, the benefit conferred, and the time required. 79 Yet, the Texar-
kana Court of Appeals looked with suspicion upon the affiant's statement
that the fees were justified for services that "have been or will be ren-
dered,"' 80 explaining that "[t]he affidavit by its own terms states that at-
torney's fees are based partly on services that have not even been
performed but only expect to be performed."' 81 While not clear from the
opinion, it is likely that the affiant was discussing fees to be awarded in
the event of the appeal as those services that "will be rendered," but the
lack of clarity resulted in confusion to the appellate court and ultimate
171. Id.
172. Id. at 803.
173. Id. (affirming award of attorneys' fees awarded for trial that exceeded three times
amount of actual damages on grounds of complexity of issues raised).
174. Id.
175. Id.; see also Cass v. Stephens, 156 S.W.3d 38, 73 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, pet.
filed) (finding attorneys' fees award of $586,162.17, more than twice the amount of dam-
ages awarded, was not excessive given protracted nature of litigation and exhaustive dis-
covery process).
176. Rolling Lands Invs., L.C. v. N.W. Airport Mgmt., L.P., 111 S.W.3d 187, 201-02








reversal of the fee award-an immeasurable price for a phrase that could
have been easily clarified.182
III. SEGREGATION OF FEES
Another common and practical problem regarding the recovery of at-
torneys' fees is how to recover fees for work performed in furtherance of
a claim for which attorneys' fees are statutorily authorized when other
claims for which attorneys' fees are not statutorily authorized are also
asserted in the same case. The general rule in Texas is that "in a case
involving more than one claim, attorneys' fees can be awarded only for
necessary legal services rendered in connection with the claims from
which recovery is authorized. ' 183 In fact, "[a] failure to segregate attor-
ney's fees in a case containing multiple causes of action, only some of
which entitle the recovery of attorney's fees, can result in the recovery of
zero attorney's fees."'184
182. It is important to remember to properly designate an expert on attorneys' fees in
discovery pursuant to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Sharp v. Broadway Nat'l Bank,
784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1990). Failure to comply with this requirement results in exclu-
sion of testimony unless the proffering party demonstrates good cause for its admission.
E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood, 741 S.W.2d 363, 364 (Tex. 1987). For example, in
GATX Tank Erection Corp. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 693 S.W.2d 617, 620-21 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the plaintiff's counsel called himself as an ex-
pert witness regarding attorney's fees, but he had not identified their attorney as a testify-
ing expert in discovery. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that testimony of the
plaintiff's counsel should have been excluded by the trial court due to plaintiff's failure to
identify counsel as a fee expert. Id.; see also Nelson v. Schanzer, 788 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied). But see Wilson v. Chazanow, 105 S.W.3d
21, 28 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.) (affirming trial court's admission of attor-
ney testimony when attorney was mistakenly designated as fact witness instead of expert
witness in pretrial disclosures). However, at least one Texas court has held that an attor-
ney who has not been identified as an expert witness with regard to attorney fees can still
testify as a fact witness regarding the facts of his representation. Budd v. Gay, 846 S.W.2d
521, 524 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ); TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 38.004 et seq. (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005); see also In re Striegler, 915 S.W.2d 629,
643-44 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996, writ denied).
183. Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex.
App.-Dallas, writ denied); see also Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E v. Newton
Corp., 97 S.W.3d 779, 789 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2003, pet. granted); Am. Hallmark Ins. Co.
v. Lyde, No. 05-97-01611-CV, 2000 WL 1702597, at *9 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 15, 2000,
pet. denied) (not designated for publication) ("segregation of attorneys' fees is required
between claims which allow recovery of fees and claims which do not."). This rule also
applies to claims against different parties. See Willis v. Donnelly, 118 S.W.3d 10 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed) ("[W]hen a lawsuit involves multiple claims or
multiple parties, the proponent has a duty to segregate non-recoverable fees from recover-
able fees, and to segregate the fees owed by different parties."); Flagship Hotel, Ltd. v.
City of Galveston, 117 S.W.3d 552, 565 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, pet. denied) ("The
general rule is that attorney's fees attributable to other defendants . . . must be segre-
gated."). However, this rule does not require a party to segregate time spent on different
theories of the same cause of action. Id.
184. Green Int'l, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997). However, at least one
court of appeals in Texas held that, in a breach of contract case, a party prevailing on a
breach of contract claim who fails to segregate fees for non-recoverable claims should not
be completely denied fees. See Willis, 118 S.W.3d at 25 n.29. Of course if objection to such
a failure to segregate is not made, the objection to recovery of all fees is waived. Id.;
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However, where the claims are "dependent upon the same set of facts
or circumstances and are thus intertwined to the point of being insepara-
ble, the party suing for attorneys' fees may recover the entire amount
covering all claims. 1 85 For this exception to apply, the claims must be so
similar that the same facts must need to be proved for both claims to
succeed. 186 In Air Routing International Corp. (Canada), ARG, v. Britan-
nia Airways, Ltd.,1 87 the Houston Court of Appeals recently determined
that a trial court could find claims to be intertwined to the point of being
inseparable without specifically concluding that the legal elements of
each of the claims are the same or substantially similar. The Houston
Court of Appeals noted that several appellate courts had compared the
essential legal elements of the claims in question when making the inter-
twined determination,1 88 but the Houston Court of Appeals concluded
that such a specific determination was not required because the Texas
Supreme Court only requires a broader finding that the various claims be
dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances. 189
Of course, to be entitled to all of a group of intertwined fees, the party
seeking fees must have prevailed on the claim that provides for the recov-
ery of fees.1 90 Further, the court-not the fact finder-makes the deter-
mination of whether fees must be segregated. 191 To be sustained on
appeal, the trial court must specifically perform this segregation analysis
when evaluating the attorneys' fee award.1 92
Mekdessi v. RISC, Inc., No. 2-02-169-CV, 2003 WL 1564304, at *4 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
Mar. 27, 2003, pet. denied).
185. City of Alamo v. Espinosa, No. 13-99-704-CV, 2001 WL 1003309, at *13 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 31, 2001, pet. dism'd by agr.); World Help v. Leisure Lifestyle,
Inc., 977 S.W.2d 662, 684 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); S. Concrete Co. v.
Metrotec Fin. Inc., 775 S.W.2d 446, 449-51 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ); Schindler v.
Austwell Farmers Coop., 829 S.W.2d 283, 288 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992) (not desig-
nated for publication), affid 841 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. 1992) (granting total amount of fees
billed when "causes of action are so intertwined that they are more or less inseparable").
186. See, e.g., Z.A.O., Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Ctr. Joint Venture, 50 S.W.3d 531, 551
(Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2001, no pet.); Lesikar v. Rappaport, 33 S.W.3d 282, 317 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). The Texarkana Court of Appeals recently noted that the test
can be met "with evidence of unsegregated attorneys' fees and a rough percent of the
amount attributable to the breach of contract claim." Flagship Hotel, 117 S.W.3d at 565
n.7.
187. 150 S.W.3d 682, 690-91 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
188. Id. (citing Geodyne Energy Income Prod. P'ship I-E, 97 S.W.3d at 789-90; Z.A.O.,
Inc., 50 S.W.3d at 550-51; AU Pharm., Inc. v. Boston, 986 S.W.2d 331, 337 (Tex. App.-
Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Wild, 944 S.W.2d 37, 41 (Tex. App.-
Amarillo 1997, writ denied); Panizo v. YMCA of the Greater Houston Area, 938 S.W.2d
163, 169-71 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ).
189. Routing Int'l, 150 S.W.3d at 691.
190. Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d 47, 51 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, writ
denied).
191. Merch. Ctr., Inc. v. WNS, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 389, 397 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2002, no
pet.).
192. Rainbow Group, Ltd. v. Johnson, No. 03-00-00559-CV, 2002 WL 1991141, at *11
(Tex. App.-Austin 2002, pet. denied) (not designated for publication). Of course, an ob-
jection to the opposing party's failure to segregate fees is waived if it is not made at the
time the evidence of fees is presented or at the time of the charge. Beard Family P'ship v.
Commercial Indem. Ins. Co., 116 S.W.3d 839, 850 (Tex. App.-Austin 2003, no pet.);
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Similarly, the general rule in Texas is that segregation of fees is re-
quired if a litigant prosecutes a counterclaim that permits recovery of at-
torneys' fees and also defends a claim in the same action; however,
segregation is not required if the fees cannot be allocated between prose-
cuting the counterclaim and defending the claim. 193 Stated another way,
if the plaintiff must defeat the counterclaim to succeed on the principal
claim because they arise out of the same facts and are mutually exclusive,
then the time spent to defend against the counterclaim need not be segre-
gated from the time spent pursuing the claim.
194
IV. RECOVERY OF COSTS AND EXPENSES
Similar to attorneys' fees, costs and expenses are not recoverable unless
there is a statute which expressly provides for recovery of the same.
195
A. RECOVERING COSTS
As a general rule "each party to a suit shall be liable to the officers of
the court for all costs incurred by himself."196 However, many costs are
recoverable by statute. For example, section 31.007 of the Civil Practice
and Remedies Code allows a judge to "include in any order or judgment
all costs," including:
1. clerk's fees and any service fees due to the county;
2. court reporter's fees for original stenographic transcripts obtained to
use in the suit;
3. the fee for masters, interpreters, and guardians ad litem appointed
by the court; and
4. other costs and fees that are permitted by these rules and state
statutes. 197
More importantly, Rule 131 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure enti-
tles a successful party to recover "all costs incurred therein" from its ad-
Holmes v. Concord Homes, Ltd., 115 S.W.3d 310, 313 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2003, no
pet.).
193. Pegasus Energy Group, Inc. v. Cheyenne Petroleum Co., 3 S.W.3d 112, 130 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied); Coleman v. Rotana, Inc., 778 S.W.2d 867, 873-74
(Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, writ denied); Wilkins v. Bain, 615 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1981, no writ) (granting all fees when the claim to recover the contract price
involves the same facts as the counterclaim).
194. Pegasus Energy Group, Inc., 3 S.W.3d at 130. But see Willis v. Donnelly, 118
S.W.3d 10, 44-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. filed) (reversing and remand-
ing fee award for failure to segregate fees in defending counterclaims and jury charge
asked for award of all fees in case).
195. "Ordinary expenses incurred by a party in prosecuting or defending suit cannot be
recovered either as damages or by way of court costs in the absence of statutory provisions
or usages of equity." Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d
622, 626 (Tex. App.-Dallas, writ denied); see also Brandtjen & Kluge v. Manney, 238
S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). To the extent possi-
ble, the award should also be segregated into the amount attributable to the portion of the
case that is successful on appeal. Holland v. Nelson, No. 05-02-00283-CV, 2003 WL
22180444, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 23, 2003, pet. denied).
196. TEX. R. Civ. P. 140.
197. TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. § 31.007 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005).
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versary. 198 "Rule 131's underlying purpose is to ensure that the
prevailing party is freed of the burden of court costs and that the losing
party pays those costs,"'199 and the court can stray from this mandatory
requirement only "for good cause. '200
"'Good cause' is an elusive concept that varies from case to case. '20 1
Generally good cause will be found when a party unnecessarily prolongs
proceedings, unreasonably increases costs, or generally does some act
worthy of sanction.202 Good cause will not, however, be found merely
because a prevailing party rejected a settlement offer larger than the
damage award.203 Normally, the non-prevailing party's inability to pay
the court costs does not in and of itself constitute good cause, 204 but some
appellate courts have indicated ability to pay can factor into a good cause
decision.20 5 Courts have also shown a willingness to find good cause
when the prevailing party benefits in some way from the activities that
created the court costs. 20 6
If the court determines costs should not be awarded, then the lack of
198. TEX. R. Civ. P. 131. However, it should be noted that the statute provides for
recovery of costs "except where otherwise provided." Id.
199. Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 378 (Tex. 2001).
200. TEX. R. Civ. P. 141. Note, however, that the Declaratory Judgment Act provides
for the award of costs to either party as are "equitable and just." TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 37.009 (Vernon 1997 & Supp. 2005); see, e.g., W. Beach Marina, Ltd. v.
Erdeljac, 94 S.W.3d 248, 270 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.).
201. Furr's, 53 S.W.3d at 377.
202. Id.
203. Nicholson v. Tashiro, 140 S.W.3d 445, 448 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, no
pet.) (reversing trial court's refusal to order costs because prevailing plaintiff rejected set-
tlement offer because "a judge is not allowed to penalize a party for refusal to enter into
settlement negotiations") (citing Gleason v. Lawson, 850 S.W.2d 714, 717-18 (Tex. App. -
Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
204. Dean's Campin' Co. v. Hardsteen, No. 01-00-01190-CV, 2002 WL 1980840, at *7
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 29, 2002, pet. denied) ("Ability to pay... does not
constitute good cause, as contemplated by Rule 141, to depart from the general rule stated
in Rule 131.").
205. See Price Constr., Inc. v. Castillo, 147 S.W.3d 431, 443 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2004, no pet.); Davis v. Henley, 471 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (remanding ad litem fee issue to trial court for determination of "(1)
whether the minor or adult [non-prevailing] plaintiffs have the ability to pay the ad litem
fee; and (2) if not, whether good cause exists under Rule 141 to tax all or part of the ad
litem fee against [defendant] as the prevailing party" and holding unsuccessful minor's
inability to pay guardian ad litem fees is sufficient to awarding such fees against successful
party when considered along with other factors). During the Survey period, the Houston
Court of Appeals (Fourteenth District) upheld a trial court's order finding of good cause
based on the prevailing party's ability to pay guardian ad litem costs and fees. City of
Houston v. Woods, 138 S.W.3d 574, 581 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
The court, however, qualified this holding by noting "without the record of the evidentiary
hearing, we must presume the evidence supports a finding of good cause." Id.
206. See Rusk v. Runge, No. 14-02-00481-CV, 2003 WL 22672182, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 13, 2003, pet. denied) (allocation of receiver's costs to prevailing
party was supported by, among other things, a specific finding that non-prevailing party
had benefited from receiver's ability to protect his assets from creditors); Henley, 471




good cause for such an award must be specifically stated on the record.20 7
Furthermore, even when the trial court states good cause on the record
"an appellate court should scrutinize the record to determine whether it
supports the trial judge's decision. 208
B. NON-RECOVERABLE COSTS
Some costs are specifically disallowed, either by statute or case law.
For example, Rule 902(10)(a) of the Texas Rules of Evidence requires a
party to bear its own copying costs if it chooses to copy records attached
to affidavits filed by another party.209Similarly, Texas Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 140 prohibits including copy charges in an award of costs. 210 Case
law also disallows certain items, such as expert witness fees211 and costs
for certified copies of deeds used at trial. 212 For example, the Dallas
Court of Appeals held that ordinary expenses like photocopy, travel, long
distance, postage, filing fees, fax charges, and messenger/courier expenses
are typically not recoverable as expenses because they are considered
part of "the overhead of a law practice" and can be recovered as a com-
ponent of reasonable attorneys' fees at least pursuant to section 38.001.213
V. CONCLUSION
This article is intended to update business litigants on recent develop-
ments in the field of recovering attorneys' fees and to provide these busi-
207. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 124-25 (Tex. 2003); Furr's, 53 S.W.3d at
376.
208. Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1996, no writ) (citing
Rogers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985)); Moore v. Trevino, 94
S.W.3d 723, 729 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) ("Because appellees were the
prevailing parties below and 'good cause' for not awarding costs to them is not stated on
the record, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to award appellees costs pursuant
to Rule 131."); Finlay v. Olive, 77 S.W.3d 520, 528 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2002,
no pet.) (finding trial court abused its discretion in not awarding costs to successful party
and stating that "we do not presume that the trial court made the necessary finding in this
situation"); see also Ray v. McFarland, 97 S.W.3d 728, 730-31 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (reversing trial court's judgment setting aside jury verdict on good faith and
just cause and holding that "[a]ccordingly, [the plaintiff] was the successful party at trial"
and since "the judgment did not state that the trial court was holding [the plaintiff] respon-
sible for her own costs for 'good cause,"' the trial court abused its discretion in taxing court
costs against the party incurring them (quoting TEX. R. Civ. P. 141)).
209. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 904(10)(a). See Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
210. TEX. R. Civ. P. 140 (providing that "no fee for a copy of a paper not required by
law or these rules to be copied shall be taxed in the bill of costs").
211. See City of Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700, 705 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
212. Phillips v. Wertz, 579 S.W.2d 279, 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Allen, 936 S.W.2d at 8.
213. Arthur's Garage, Inc. v. Racal-Chubb Sec. Sys., Inc., 997 S.W.2d 803, 817 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.); Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe & Steel, Inc., 739
S.W.2d 622, 626-27 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ denied); see also Shaikh v. Aerovias De
Mex., 127 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (holding costs of
copies of deposition transcripts, videotapes, and litigation documents and costs associated
with travel of counsel to attend deposition were not properly recoverable and were part of
the "expenses of litigation").
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ness litigants with tools helpful in recovering (or defending against the
recovery of) attorneys' fees in Texas. As with any field of law, this recov-
ery is an art, not a science, is ever-changing, and oft times requires trial
and error to succeed.
